Another Report Direct from Geneva

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How the Press Is Brain-Washed and the Neutrals Gulled

Geneva, April 6

This 17-nation disarmament conference is neither secret nor open, but combines the worst aspects of both kinds of diplomacy. The meetings are closed to the press, but each participant is free, if it thinks it has made a particularly effective point, to release the text of its own statement afterwards. The press is dependent on these, on stray leaks, and on the daily briefings. These are held by the information officers of the larger powers, at about the same time, right after the daily session breaks up. This time element plus the language barrier prevents one from attending all, and comparing the various versions of what occurred, an exercise in comparative propaganda which would be most enlightening but would require an international monitoring team of independent journalists.

By That Time The Story Is Dead

Every day a verbatim record is made of each session, and this is available in the main languages of the conference next morning, as with the meetings of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly in New York. But in this case the verbatim record is kept from the press and public. This procedure, which also marked the predecessor conferences here on nuclear testing, suits the routine coverage of the wire services and the cold war zealots but is frustrating to the conscientious reporter, for only in the verbatims can one see the informal discussion, catch the finer crucial points and learn more fully what the neutrals really had to say. The verbatims are not, strictly speaking, secret but they are not made available until weeks after the conference is over, and then only in a scant few copies. This was brought home to several delegations in New York last winter during the General Assembly debates on nuclear testing when they wanted to study the records of the nuclear conferences at Geneva and found only one copy in the United Nations library. By the time the verbatims are available, the story is dead, the reporters are too busy, the public's attention is elsewhere.

In the meantime opinion has been formed by the briefings. To understand these one must break out of the semantic fogs of our Orwellian times. The government information officer, to speak plainly, is a *mis*information officer; his job is not to inform the press, but to put across the particular version or distortion, previously decided upon by the government for which he works. The briefing is a mild but effective variety of brain-washing. It is a pity some foundation independent of the earthly powers could not finance a kinescopic record of these briefings: the slanted remarks, the snicker, the ironic smile, require camera as well as tape recorder. Arguments of which the government disapproves are made to seem silly; key technical points are given rapid fire treatment so hurried and obscure as to hide their significance; one's own position is high-lighted, the adversary's is twisted and the neutral's is given only a quick once-over.

The mimeograph machines grind quickly and they grind exceedingly well when the government concerned wants to put something across. But on other occasions, when it is decided by our opinion manipulators that the details were better left in twilight, little is forthcoming. On Wednesday of this week Arthur Dean made two important statements, one on the technical problems of a test ban, the other on the principles the U.S. would like to see in the preamble, but the former was so swiftly summarized by the briefing officer that the crucial details were blurred and the latter was available only in a badly typed copy one could see only at the U.S. Information offices downtown.

These practices are not, of course, a monopoly of our side. The Russians are past masters at this business. Mr. Zorin provided an interesting specimen in the speech he made Wednes-

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If No Security This Way, Why Test?

"We sincerely hope that another effort can be made by the powers directly concerned . . . to reach agreement and to avert this new threat of another spiral of tests. . . . There are not just two sides to this question, namely, the Western side and the other side: there is the third side, represented by the unaligned countries. And there is a wider side than the unaligned countries: there is the world itself. There is the opinion of the world itself, Mr. Chairman, and I think you will bear with me, and I trust the representative of the Soviet Union will bear with me, when I say that whoever tests, whoever embarks upon this series and whoever continues it, will earn the bitter resentment of the world, will cause a feeling of deep disappointment in the world that this spiral of tests should be recommended and continued.

"I address this, naturally, to both sides because we understand both are preparing tests. It will be of no help to the future to say that the purpose of further testing was a search for security. No security can be found in this way—and the leaders of both sides have said so. The leaders of both sides have said that there can be no security through the perfection of weapons of mass destruction. This is such a basic contradiction that it tremendously increases the apprehension of the world. Obviously we are standing near a very dangerous precipice if the very countries which announce that they cannot find security in the development of weapons still go ahead and develop weapons of mass destruction further and further."

—Ambassador Lall of India, at Geneva, April 4.

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day of this week on the problem of nuclear testing, which was released to the press after the session. The Soviet reader who has no access to the Western press would get a false picture from this of the neutral position. From Mr. Zorin's account the unwary reader would never guess that while the neutrals generally believe existing national systems can adequately monitor a testing agreement they also believe (as may be seen from the Burmese speech in the box on page 3) that some form of neutral or independent inspection is necessary to resolve disputes. Mr. Zorin made no reference to this.* The neutrals—and with them privately many Canadian and British representatives—have come to feel that the U.S. is greatly exaggerating the difficulty of detecting underground tests while the Russians are exaggerating the ease with which they may be monitored.

How the Neutrals Can "Test"

In an article for the forthcoming (April 13) issue of the London *New Statesman and Nation,* I am suggesting that there is an easy way for the neutrals to test the conflicting claims of the two great nuclear powers. The Russians claimed in their press this week that they had detected all 23 underground tests exploded up until then in the current U.S. series. Since the 23 covers only the *announced* tests and the AEC has made it clear from the beginning that there would be some secret unannounced tests in the series, the Russians could clinch their argument if they now came forward and gave the dates and numbers of the secret tests in the U.S. series. The neutrals ought to challenge the Russians to do so. A second challenge would be for the neutrals to ask Russia to disclose the size of the nuclear test it held underground last February 2. The purpose, as Khrushchev boasted, was to prove that any underground blast in the Soviet Union would at once be detected in the U.S., and the AEC did indeed announce the event and its location (at the Semipalatinsk proving grounds in Central Asia) within a few hours.

Mr. Dean in a speech to the plenary session on April 2 tried to explain this away by saying that the Soviet shot was "quite a large one." One head of a neutral delegation informed me Dr. Jerome Wiesner when he was here told him that the Soviet shot was 100 kilotons. U.S. sources with which I checked this denied it and insisted that Dr. Wiesner had said 50 kilotons. But in Swedish circles I was told that Upsala observatory in Sweden, which also identified the Soviet shot, and originally calculated it at 5 kilotons, now officially computed it at ten. The Western position has been that shots under 20 kilotons could not even be detected with certainty by international listening posts on Soviet soil; 20 kilotons was the threshold of the abortive East-West agreement. Below this threshold, there was to be a moratorium pending new and better methods of detection. If the Swedes are right and the Soviet test was only 10 kilotons, then detection of underground tests is much easier than the U.S. claims.

I suggested in the *New Statesman* that the neutrals ought also to challenge the U.S. government to produce two still unpublished reports, one showing the results obtained by our Coast and Geodetic Survey in monitoring our own recent tests underground and the other analyzing the reports turned in to Coast and Geodetic by foreign stations which monitored Project Gnome, where we set off our first underground test in a salt formation. The Coast and Geodetic network extends from Alaska through Panama to the Antarctic and westward to Guam and Okinawa. The report was made weeks ago to the

*** Our press has paid little attention to neutral opinion at the conference. In the boxes in this week's and last week's issue I have tried to give a sampling of the views expressed by the neutrals and the Canadians.**

Sweden's Control Proposal

"Would it not be worth while to examine whether a solution to the problem of continuous control could be found on a non-political, non-military, purely scientific basis? It should be considered to what extent one might rely on the already existing network of observation posts in the field of meteorology, seismology, etc. or a network which could be enlarged and improved, and have the observations and data registered there collected in an international center where a commission composed of prominent scientists through analyses of data on radioactive fallout, seismographic phenomena and other facts would be able to establish the probability of a nuclear weapon test in violation of the treaty. Such an organ, which should be completely independent, ought also to have the possibility in accordance with certain established procedures to arrange inspections to establish the facts in possibly doubtful cases."

—Ambassador Edberg, Sweden, at Geneva April 2

Canada's "No Bombs in Space" Proposal Which Riled the U.S. Delegation

"In the opinion of my delegation it would be useful to begin with the question of outer space. . . .

"In Article 14 of the Soviet draft treaty it is provided that the orbiting or stationing in outer space of special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited. The U.S. plan contains similar proposals in Section E of Stage 1. In the same section of the U.S. plan, provision is also made for advance notification of launchings of space vehicles and missiles. The USSR draft treaty contains an almost identical proposal in Article 14. My delegation considers that it would be of great significance to give formal recognition to the large measure of agreement which already exists on these two points in the U.S. and Soviet disarmament plans . . . in the form of a declaration by all members of this Conference . . . to ensure that outer space will be used for peaceful purposes only. . . .

"I am aware that the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is now meeting in New York. It is a source of encouragement to us . . . but as the title of the Committee itself indicates its activities are specifically restricted to cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

"It is not our purpose here to set down in full the requirements for cooperation in outer space. It is rather to achieve two specific ends: first, that outer space will not be used for the stationing or orbiting of mass destruction weapons; and second that the fear of the illegitimate use of space vehicles and missiles will be greatly reduced through the advance notification to an international authority of any proposed launchings. . . . The acceptance of the proposed draft declaration would be a major advance towards a rule of peace and law in outer space."

—Howard Green, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, at Geneva, March 26. Mr. Green was criticized by the U.S. delegation for making this proposal without first clearing it with them. The U.S. is opposed to such a declaration. This may explain Mr. Green's angry statement on returning to Canada, "We did not go to Geneva to please the U.S."

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Atomic Energy Commission which is withholding it. Does it show detection and identification are as difficult as the U.S. government claims? The U.S. believes strongly in the principle of international inspection. The neutrals ought to insist on inspecting this report and the one on Project Gnome.

In the March 19 issue of the *Weekly* I disclosed facts about the Project Gnome report of which few people here, even on our own delegation, seem to be aware. The results were encouraging in that (1) of 90 foreign stations reporting, almost all registered a first compressional P wave, the identifying mark of a nuclear explosion as distinct from an earthquake, (2) with the data, Coast and Geodetic was able to plot a travel time curve with which the location of the blast was located within several tenths of a mile, rebutting Dr. Teller's claim that an underground blast could not be located that closely and (3) it showed that Dr. Teller's "big hole" theory of concealment was wrong in at least one important respect; detonation in salt, according to him, was supposed to reduce the seismic signal by a factor of 3. Instead the signal was magnified somewhere between two and three times when detected and identified as far away as Sweden and Japan.

Misrepresenting the Facts

Not only have these facts been withheld from the Geneva conference, but they have been misrepresented by Mr. Dean. He told the 13th plenary meeting on April 2 "detection of the 'Gnome' shot was made relatively easy by the fact that it was fired in a solid salt formation so that the coupling of the explosive energy into the ground was very strong and the resulting seismic signals were of a high intensity. The U.S. underground shots fired in other media have been much less easily detected. . . ." This was sharp legal pleading but hardly scientific candor. The only "other media" in which we have set off underground shots was in soft volcanic Nevada "tuff". The Teller theory was that setting them off in salt or hard rock would muffle the blast, reducing the seismic signal by a factor of three as compared with Nevada tuff. The neutrals ought to demand that the U.S. tell the full and whole truth about Project Gnome.*

Into this den of plain and fancy prevaricators, playing games Geneva has come to know so well over the years, there descended last Monday a delegation of 50 American women on a Quixotic mission, somehow to reach the hearts and minds of the diplomats here for the great Powers. The women came from 18 States; they included a Negro woman freedom rider from Jackson, Miss., and Mrs. Martin Luther King; one was

*** Mr. Dean also said it was not surprising that Japanese, Finnish and Swedish seismologists picked up the Gnome shot since "the exact date, hour and minute" was known in advance so all they had to do was "to study their recordings carefully for that particular point in time, and if they found anything in that location they could ascribe it to 'Gnome'." This does not accord with what I learned at Coast and Geodetic where I was told the Finns turned in a clear direction of first motion seismograph even though they did not know that at the last moment the Gnome shot had been postponed four hours. It also does not agree with Coast and Geodetic's finding that virtually all of the reporting foreign stations showed a first compressional P wave and not just "anything in that location" as Mr. Dean phrased it.**

Zorin's "No" To Any Form of Test Inspection

"Mr. Godber [of the United Kingdom delegation] formulated some questions and, in fact, he asked for three simple replies from me to his three questions. His first question was: 'Firstly, does the Soviet Union offer us no hope of any form of international inspection of any unidentified events in the Soviet Union, in any circumstances, short of the achievement of complete and general disarmament?' My answer is: No, there is no hope.

"Mr. Godber's second question was: 'Secondly, does the Soviet Union reject, on grounds of espionage, the presence of unaligned nations on a visiting inspection team? If so, why do they reject it?' This question is not one which we face, because we reject a system of international inspection for this purpose. Therefore the composition of the inspection team is not relevant."

—Mr. Zorin at the 15th plenary, Geneva, April 4.

Burma's Eloquent Plea Against New Tests and For A Compromise on Inspection

"In the course of private exchanges we have heard it stated that resumption of tests is inevitable, and this Conference must, and can, learn to live with them. . . .

"I am not one of those who share the view that this Conference is doomed to failure. Indeed, I have been moderately encouraged. . . . But who will deny that the going has not been easy, and this at a time when we have been dealing with generalities and matters of procedure. Would anyone deny that the main obstacles lie ahead, and that we will need a helpful climate and atmosphere if we are to have any chance of success in overcoming them? Would such an atmosphere be engendered by a series of nuclear explosions spread over a period of weeks, and possibly of months? And even if we who assembled in Geneva could take a pragmatic view of this paradoxical situation, would the outside world understand? Indeed, would they even hear us against the reverberating echoes of the nuclear tests? . . .

"It seems to us that the claim of the Soviet Union that all nuclear explosions can be detected and identified by means of national detection systems, and that no international control is therefore necessary, leaves one vital question unanswered. It is, what happens in the event of a dispute as to the facts of a particular event? . . . How would a difference of this kind be resolved unless there were in existence some impartial international scientific body, acceptable to all the nuclear powers? . . .

"On the other hand, Mr. Chairman, my delegation wonders whether such an international scientific body need be as elaborate as that envisaged by the two Western nuclear powers. The principle cause of concern would appear to be the difficulty of distinguishing between certain types of earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions. . . . But if this is correct, the next question which arises is, how significant from the military point of view are underground nuclear tests, particularly those with a low yield which are difficult to distinguish from earthquakes? . . . Is it essential that *any system of international control* over a test ban treaty should be such as to be able theoretically to identify every suspicious event, regardless of its military significance? . . . Might not a less elaborate international system, perhap omitting control posts from the territories of those who object to them, but with the right to conduct an agreed number of properly safeguarded on-site inspections by the international control, serve all our purposes just as well?

"It would be more than tragic if antipathy to even a minimum of international control on one side, and insistence on near theoretical perfection on the other, were to doom the entire world to a new cycle of nuclear weapons tests with all the evils that inevitably follow in its wake."

—Ambassador Barrington of Burma at Geneva April 2.

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Mr. Dean Was Cold and Mr. Zorin Warm But Otherwise Alike

(Continued from Page Three)

a Bronx housewife who saw the Warsaw ghetto uprising and lived through Nazi concentration camps; another, an American woman who was in Japan when we bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the most prominent was Mrs. Cyrus Eaton, wife of the Cleveland industrialist who launched the Pugwash movement; the leader was Dagmar Wilson of Washington, D. C. who started Women Strike for Peace last Fall. The U.S. government should have paid their fare, for they gave the outside world a glimpse of a different America not often discernible in our official representatives, and more to our country's credit.

The Familiar State Dept. Lecture

On Monday they saw Mr. Dean. On Tuesday they saw Mr. Zorin. On Wednesday, joined by 50 women from nine other countries, they marched in procession to the Palais des Nations where the 17-nation disarmament conference is in session. They brought with them 50,000 signatures to a petition asking for a test ban now and continuous sessions until real progress in disarmament had been made. The Americans had greeted them coldly and lectured them in the patronizing fashion of State Department briefings. The Russians had overwhelmed them with hospitality. In other delegations, they met a mixed reception; perhaps the most truly sympathetic were the Canadians, our most independent, thoughtful and restless ally. At the Palais des Nations on Wednesday, they were shepherded into Salle III with its high curtained windows and small balcony. There they sat in silence until the session ended when the bulldoggish looking Mr. Dean and Mr. Zorin, with the look of an elderly scholar, listened to their statements (see box on this page) and received their petition. Mr. Zorin to everyone's surprise made a short address in reply and so Mr. Dean followed suit. "Neither," as the women commented dryly in a press release afterwards, "could resist maintaining that *their* government was right and just and in essence merely repeating what they had each stated to us separately. The general consensus was only that we had witnessed a more modified and polished performance by two practiced professionals."

The earlier private sessions with Mr. Dean and Mr. Zorin separately had reduced some of the women to despair. Though Mr. Dean was hostile and Mr. Zorin friendly, the women found them remarkably similar in nationalistic attitude. Mr. Dean said we couldn't trust the Russians and if there was a question of the survival of our way of life, we had to test. Mr. Zorin said the same thing in slightly different form. He said the Soviets could not, as the women urged, act morally and display good will because the West was threatening the socialist East "and our people demand maximum security." One woman in tears after Mr. Dean said in the hall outside, "There is no hope." Another, in tears just after seeing Mr. Zorin, cried, "so many words and they're all alike." Geneva could not find a more accurate epitaph.

The Voice of Women at Geneva

"We greet Mr. Dean and Mr. Zorin as the co-chairmen of the 17-nation Disarmament Conference. We women from ten nations have come to Geneva because of our anxiety over the lack of progress which is being made. We have never met each other before. We speak many languages. In spite of the difficulty in communication, we have an understanding that made it possible for us to reach agreement as to what must be done. This unifying element was our concern for the future of mankind.

"We thank the delegates for giving us their time, and answering our questions which they did by expressing the point of view of their governments. We were not reassured by the answers we received. We saw no change in attitude. You are constantly concerned with national security, national sovereignty, national prestige. All these outmoded ideas must be abandoned. We feel that this kind of thinking is no longer relevant in a nuclear age when the security of one is the security of all.

"We are not interested in techniques of inspection of nuclear tests and the arms race. We are here to remind you of the real purpose of this conference which is to reach an agreement. We are entrusting you with the gravest responsibility that men have ever had before in human history. In your hands lies the fate of the human race. We have one great concern—our children."

—Mrs. Dagmar Wilson, leader of Women Strike for Peace, addressing the U.S. and Soviet co-chairmen of the disarmament conference at the Palais de Nations, Geneva, April 4, on the presentation of a petition signed by 50,000 American women against nuclear testing and for disarmament.

Next Week: The U.S. and Soviet Plans on General Disarmament Compared

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